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FUNCTIONAL INTERPRETATION AND
INDUCTIVE DEFINITIONS
JEREMY AVIGAD AND HENRY TOWSNER
Abstract. Extending Go¨del’s Dialectica interpretation, we provide a func-
tional interpretation of classical theories of positive arithmetic inductive defi-
nitions, reducing them to theories of finite-type functionals defined using trans-
finite recursion on well-founded trees.
1. Introduction
Let X be a set, and let Γ be a monotone operator from the power set of X to
itself, so that A ⊆ B implies Γ(A) ⊆ Γ(B). Then the set
I =
⋂
{A | Γ(A) ⊆ A}
is a least fixed point of Γ; that is, Γ(I) = I, and I is a subset of any other set
with this property. I can also be characterized as the limit of a sequence indexed
by a sufficiently long segment of the ordinals, defined by I0 = ∅, Iα+1 = Γ(Iα),
and Iλ =
⋃
γ<λ Iγ for limit ordinals γ. Such inductive definitions are common
in mathematics; they can be used, for example, to define substructures generated
by sets of elements, the collection of Borel subsets of the real line, or the set of
well-founded trees on the natural numbers.
From the point of view of proof theory and descriptive set theory, one is often
interested in structures that are countably based, that is, can be coded so that
X is a countable set. In that case, the sequence Iα stabilizes before the least
uncountable ordinal. In many interesting situations, the operator Γ is given by a
positive arithmetic formula ϕ(x, P ), in the sense that Γ(A) = {x | ϕ(x,A)} and
ϕ is an arithmetic formula in which the predicate P occurs only positively. (The
positivity requirement can be expressed by saying that no occurrence of P is negated
when ϕ is written in negation-normal form.)
The considerations above show that the least fixed point of a positive arithmetic
inductive definition can be defined by a Π11 formula. An analysis due to Stephen
Kleene [20, 21] shows that, conversely, a positive arithmetic inductive definition
can be used to define a complete Π11 set. In the 1960’s, Georg Kreisel presented
axiomatic theories of such inductive definitions [25, 9]. In particular, the theory
ID1 consists of first-order arithmetic augmented by additional predicates intended
to denote least fixed-points of positive arithmetic operators. ID1 is known to have
the same strength as the subsystem Π 11 -CA
−
of second order arithmetic, which has
a comprehension axiom asserting the existence of sets of numbers defined by Π11
formulas without set parameters. It also has the same strength as Kripke Platek
Work by the first author has been partially supported by NSF grant DMS-0700174 and a grant
from the John Templeton Foundation.
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admissible set theory, KPω, with an axiom asserting the existence of an infinite
set. (See [9, 19] for details.)
A Π2 sentence is one of the form ∀x¯ ∃y¯ R(x¯, y¯), where x¯ and y¯ are tuples of
variables ranging over the natural numbers, and R is a primitive recursive relation.
Here we are concerned with the project of characterizing the Π2 consequences of
the theories ID1 in constructive or computational terms. This can be done in a
number of ways. For example, every Π2 theorem of ID1 is witnessed by a function
that can be defined in a language of higher-type functionals allowing primitive
recursion on the natural numbers as well as a schema of recursion along well-
founded trees, as described in Section 2 below. We are particularly interested in
obtaining a translation from ID1 to a constructive theory of such functions that
makes it possible to “read off” a description of the witnessing function from the
proof of a Π2 sentence in ID1 .
There are currently two ways of obtaining this information. The first involves
using ordinal analysis to reduce ID1 to a constructive analogue [8, 26, 27], such as
the theory ID i,sp1 discussed below, and then using either a realizability argument or
a Dialectica interpretation of the latter [18, 7]. One can, alternatively, use a forcing
interpretation due to Buchholz [7, 2] to reduce ID1 to ID
i,sp
1 .
Here we present a new method of carrying out this first step, based on a func-
tional interpretation along the lines of Go¨del’s “Dialectica” interpretation of first-
order arithmetic. Such functional interpretations have proved remarkably effective
in “unwinding” computational and otherwise explicit information from classical ar-
guments (see, for example, [22, 23, 24]). Howard [18] has provided a functional
interpretation for a restricted version of the constructive theory ID i,sp1 , but the
problem of obtaining such an interpretation for classical theories of inductive def-
initions is more difficult, and was posed as an outstanding problem in [6, Section
9.8]. Feferman [12] used a Dialectica interpretation to obtain ordinal bounds on the
strength of ID1 (the details are sketched in [6, Section 9]), and Zucker [36] used a
similar interpretation to bound the ordinal strength of ID2 . But these interpreta-
tions do not yield Π2 reductions to constructive theories, and hence do not provide
computational information; nor do the methods seem to extend to the theories be-
yond ID2 . Our interpretation bears similarities to those of Burr [10] and Ferreira
and Oliva [13], but is not subsumed by either; some of the differences between the
various approaches are indicated in Section 4.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we describe the relevant
theories and provide an overview of our results. Our interpretation of ID1 is pre-
sented in three steps. In Section 3, we embed ID1 in an intermediate theory, OID1 ,
which makes the transfinite construction of the fixed-point explicit. In Section 4,
we present a functional interpretation that reduces OID1 to a second intermediate
theory, Q0TΩ + (I ). Finally, the latter theory is interpreted in a constructive the-
ory, QT iΩ , using a cut elimination argument in Section 5. In Section 6, we show that
our interpretation extends straightforwardly to cover theories of iterated inductive
definitions as well.
We are grateful to Solomon Feferman, Philipp Gerhardy, Paulo Oliva, and Wil-
fried Sieg for feedback on an earlier draft; and we are especially grateful to Fernando
Ferreira for a very careful reading and substantive corrections.
FUNCTIONAL INTERPRETATION AND INDUCTIVE DEFINITIONS 3
2. Background
In this paper, we interpret classical theories of inductively defined sets in con-
structive theories of transfinite recursion on well-founded trees. In this section, we
describe the relevant theories, and provide an overview of our results.
Take classical first-order Peano arithmetic, PA, to be formulated in a language
with symbols for each primitive recursive function and relation. The axioms of PA
consist of basic axioms defining these functions and relations, and the schema of
induction,
ϕ(0) ∧ ∀x (ϕ(x)→ ϕ(x + 1))→ ∀x ϕ(x),
where ϕ is any formula in the language, possibly with free variables other than x.
ID1 is an extension of PA with additional predicates Iψ intended to denote the least
fixed point of the positive arithmetic operator given by ψ. Specifically, let ψ(x, P )
be an arithmetic formula with at most the free variable x, in which the predicate
symbol P occurs only positively. We adopt the practice of writing x ∈ Iψ instead
of Iψ(x). ID1 then includes the following axioms:
• ∀x (ψ(x, Iψ)→ x ∈ Iψ)
• ∀x (ψ(x, θ/P )→ θ(x))→ ∀x ∈ Iψ θ(x), for each formula θ(x).
Here, the notation ψ(θ/P ) denotes the result of replacing each atomic formula P (t)
with θ(t), renaming bound variables to prevent collisions. The first axiom asserts
that Iψ is closed with respect to Γψ, while the second axiom schema expresses that
Iψ is the smallest such set, among those sets that can be defined in the language.
Below we will use the fact that this schema, as well as the schema of induction,
can be expressed as rules. For example, Iψ-leastness is equivalent to the rule “from
∀x (ψ(x, θ′/P ) → θ′(x)) conclude ∀x ∈ Iψ θ
′(x).” To see this, note that the rule
is easily justified using the corresponding axiom; conversely, one obtains the axiom
for θ(x) by taking θ′(x) to be the formula (∀z (ψ(z, θ/P ) → θ(z))) → θ(x) in the
rule.
One can also design theories of inductive definitions based on intuitionistic logic.
In order for these theories to be given a reasonable constructive interpretation,
however, one needs to be more careful in specifying the positivity requirement on ψ.
One option is to insist that P does not occur in the antecedent of any implication,
where ¬η is taken to abbreviate η → ⊥. Such a definition is said to be strictly
positive, and we denote the corresponding axiomatic theory ID i,sp1 . An even more
restrictive requirement is to insist that ψ(x) is of the form ∀y ≺ x P (y), where ≺
is a primitive recursive relation. These are called accessibility inductive definitions,
and serve to pick out the well-founded part of the relation. In the case where ≺ is
the “child-of” relation on a tree, the inductive definition picks out the well-founded
part of that tree. We will denote the corresponding theory ID i,acc1 .
The following conservation theorem can be obtained via an ordinal analysis [9]
or the methods of Buchholz [7]:
Theorem 2.1. Every Π2 sentence provable in ID1 is provable in ID
i,acc
1 .
The methods we introduce here provide another route to this result.
Using a primitive recursive coding of pairs and writing x ∈ Iy for (x, y) ∈ I
allows us to code any finite or infinite sequence of sets as a single set. One can
show that in any of the theories just described, any number of inductively defined
sets can coded into a single one, and so, for expository convenience, we will assume
that each theory uses only a single inductively defined set.
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We now turn to theories of transfinite induction and recursion on well-founded
trees. The starting point is a quantifier-free theory, TΩ , of computable functionals
over the natural numbers and the set of well-founded trees on the natural numbers.
In particular, TΩ extends Go¨del’s theory T of computable functionals over the
natural numbers. We begin by reviewing the theory T . The set of finite types is
defined inductively, as follows:
• N is a finite type; and
• assuming σ and τ are finite types, so are σ × τ and σ → τ .
In the “full” set-theoretic interpretation, N denotes the set of natural numbers, σ×τ
denotes the set of ordered pairs consisting of an element of σ and an element of τ ,
and σ → τ denotes the set of functions from σ to τ . But we can also view the finite
types as nothing more than datatype specifications of computational objects. The
set of primitive recursive functionals of finite type is a set of computable functionals
obtained from the use of explicit definition, application, pairing, and projections,
and a scheme allowing the definition of a new functional F by primitive recursion:
F (0) = a
F (x+ 1) = G(x, F (x))
Here, the range of F may be any finite type. The theory T includes defining
equations for all the primitive recursive functionals, and a rule providing induction
for quantifier-free formulas ϕ:
ϕ(0) ϕ(x)→ ϕ(S(x))
ϕ(t)
Go¨del’s Dialectica interpretation shows:
Theorem 2.2. If PA proves a Π2 theorem ∀x¯ ∃y¯ R(x¯, y¯), there is a sequence of
function symbols f¯ such that T proves R(x¯, f¯(x¯)). In particular, every Π2 theorem
of PA is witnessed by sequence of primitive recursive functionals of type Nk → N .
See [15, 6, 35] for details. If (st) is used to denote the result of applying s to
t, we adopt the usual conventions of writing, for example, stuv for (((st)u)v). To
improve readability, however, we will also sometimes adopt conventional function
notation, and write s(t, u, v) for the same term.
In order to capture the Π2 theorems of ID1 , we use an extension of T that is
essentially due to Howard [18], and described in [6, Section 9.1]. Extend the finite
types by adding a new base type, Ω, which is intended to denote the set of well-
founded (full) trees on N . We add a constant, e, which denote the tree with just
one node, and two new operations: sup, of type (N → Ω)→ Ω, which forms a new
tree from a sequence of subtrees, and sup−1, of type Ω→ (N → Ω), which returns
the immediate subtrees of a nontrivial tree. We extend the schema of primitive
recursion on N in T to the larger system, and add a principle of primitive recursion
on Ω:
F (e) = a
F (sup h) = G(λn F (h(n))),
where the range of F can be any of the new types. We call the resulting theory TΩ ,
and the resulting set of functionals the primitive recursive tree functionals. Below
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we will adopt the notation α[n] instead of sup−1(α, n) to denote the nth subtree of
α. In that case definition by transfinite recursion can be expressed as follows:1
F (α) =
{
a if α = e
G(λn F (α[n])) otherwise.
A trick due to Kreisel (see [17, 18]) allows us to derive a quantifier-free rule of
transfinite induction on Ω in TΩ , using induction on N and transfinite recursion.
Proposition 2.3. The following is a derived rule of TΩ :
ϕ(e, x) α 6= e ∧ ϕ(α[g(α, x)], h(α, x)) → ϕ(α, x)
ϕ(s, t)
for quantifier-free formulas ϕ.
For the sake of completeness, we sketch a proof in the Appendix.
We define QTΩ to be the extension of TΩ which allows quantifiers over all the
types of the latter theory, strengthening the previous transfinite induction rule with
a full transfinite induction axiom schema,
ϕ(e) ∧ ∀α (α 6= e ∧ ∀n ϕ(α[n])→ ϕ(α))→ ∀α ϕ(α)
where ϕ is any formula in the expanded language. Let QT iΩ denote the version of
this theory based on intuitionistic logic.
We can also add to QT iΩ an ω-bounding axiom schema,
∀x ∃α ψ(x, α)→ ∃β ∀x ∃i ψ(x, β[i]),
where x is of type N , α is of type Ω, and ψ only has quantifiers over N . The
following theorem shows that all of the intuitionistic theories described in this
section are “morally equivalent,” and reducible to TΩ .
Theorem 2.4. The following theories all prove the same Π2 sentences:
(1) ID i,sp1
(2) ID i,acc1
(3) QT iΩ + (ω-bounding)
(4) QT iΩ
(5) TΩ
Proof. Buchholz [7] presents a realizability interpretation of ID i,sp1 in the theory
ID i,acc1 . Howard [18] presents an embedding of ID
i,acc
1 in QT
i
Ω + (ω-bounding).
Howard [18] also presents a functional interpretation of QT iΩ + (ω-bounding) in
TΩ , which is included in QT
i
Ω ; Proposition 2.3 is used to interpret the transfinite
induction axioms of the source theory. Interpreting TΩ in ID
i,sp
1 is straightforward,
using the set O of Church-Kleene ordinal notations to interpret the type Ω, and
interpreting the constants of TΩ as hereditarily recursive operations over O (see [6,
Sections 4.1, 9.5, and 9.6]). 
1We are glossing over issues involving the treatment of equality in our descriptions of both
T and TΩ . All of the ways of dealing with equality in T described in [6, Section 2.5] carry
over to TΩ , and our interpretations work with even the most minimal version of equality axioms
associated with the theory denoted T0 there. In particular, our interpretations to not rely on
extensionality, or the assumption ∀n (α[n] = β[n]) → α = β.
Our theory TΩ is essentially the theory V of Howard [18]. Our theory QT
i
Ω is essentially a
finite-type version of the theory U of [18], and contained in the theory V ∗ described there. One
minor difference is that Howard takes the nodes of his trees to be labeled, with end-nodes labeled
by a positive natural number, and internal nodes labeled 0.
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In fact, Howard’s work [18] shows that Theorem 2.4 still holds as stated if one
allows arbitrary formulas ψ(x, α) of QT iΩ in the ω-bounding axiom schema. In the
classical theories considered below, however, the restriction to arithmetic quanti-
fiers is necessary. We have therefore chosen to use the name (ω-bounding) for the
restricted version.
We can now describe our main results. In Sections 3 to 5, we present the inter-
pretation outlined in the introduction, which yields:
Theorem 2.5. Every Π2 sentence provable in ID1 is provable in QT
i
Ω .
In fact, if ID1 proves a Π2 theorem ∀x¯ ∃y¯ R(x¯, y¯), our proof yields a sequence
of function symbols f¯ such that QT iΩ proves R(x¯, f¯(x¯)). By Theorem 2.4, this last
assertion can even be proved in TΩ . Thus we have:
Theorem 2.6. If ID1 proves a Π2 theorem ∀x¯ ∃y¯ R(x¯, y¯), there is a sequence
of function symbols f¯ such that TΩ proves R(x¯, f¯(x¯)). In particular, every Π2
theorem of ID1 is witnessed by sequence of primitive recursive tree functionals of
type Nk → N .
The reduction described by Sections 3 to 5 is thus analogous to the reduction
of ID1 given by Buchholz [7], but relies on a functional interpretation instead of
forcing.
3. Embedding ID1 in OID1
In this section, we introduce a theory OID1 , which makes the transfinite con-
struction of the fixed points of ID1 explicit. We then show that ID1 is easily
interpreted in OID1 . The theory OID1 is closely related to Feferman’s theory
ORω1 , as described in [12] and [6, Section 9], and the embedding is similar to the
one described there.
Fix any instance of ID1 with inductively defined predicate I given by the positive
arithmetic formula ψ(x, P ). The corresponding instance ofOID1 is two-sorted, with
variables α, β, γ, . . . ranging over type Ω, and variables i, j, k, n, x, . . . ranging over
N . We include symbols for the primitive recursive functions on N , and a function
symbol sup−1(α, n) which returns an element of type Ω. As above, we write α[n]
for sup−1(α, n). Recall that α[n] is intended to denote the nth subtree of α, or e
if α = e. The language includes an equality symbol for terms of type N , but not
for terms of type Ω. We include, however, a unary predicate “α = e,” which holds
when α is the tree with just one node. Finally, there is a binary predicate I(α, x),
where α ranges over Ω and x ranges over N . We will write x ∈ Iα instead of I(α, x),
and write x ∈ I≺α for ∃i (x ∈ Iα[i]). The axioms of OID1 are as follows:
(1) defining axioms for the primitive recursive functions
(2) induction on N
(3) transfinite induction on Ω
(4) α = e→ α[i] = e
(5) the schema of ω-bounding :
∀x ∃α ϕ(x, α)→ ∃β ∀x ∃i ϕ(x, β[i]),
where ϕ has no quantifiers over type Ω.
(6) ∀x (x 6∈ Ie)
(7) ∀α (α 6= e→ ∀x (x ∈ Iα ↔ ψ(x, I≺α)))
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The last two axioms assert that Iα is the hierarchy of sets satisfying Ie = ∅ and
Iα = Γψ(I≺α) when α 6= e. For any formula ϕ of ID1 , let ϕˆ be the formula obtained
by interpreting t ∈ I as ∃α (t ∈ Iα).
Theorem 3.1. If ID1 proves ϕ, then OID1 proves ϕˆ.
We need two lemmas. In the first, let I≺α ⊆ I≺β abbreviate the formula ∀x (x ∈
I≺α → x ∈ I≺β).
Lemma 3.2. OID1 proves that for every α and i, I≺α[i] ⊆ I≺α.
Proof. Use transfinite induction on α. If α is equal to e, the conclusion is immediate
from the fourth axiom. In the inductive step, suppose x is in I≺α[i]. Then for some
j, x is in Iα[i][j]. By the last axiom, we have ψ(x, I≺α[i][j]). By the inductive
hypothesis, we have I≺α[i][j] ⊆ I≺α[i], and so, by the positivity of ψ, we have
ψ(x, I≺α[i]). By the last axiom again, we have x ∈ Iα[i], and hence x ∈ I≺α, as
required. 
Note that if η(x, P ) is any arithmetic formula involving a new predicate symbol
P and θ(y) is any formula, applying the ·ˆ-translation to η(x, θ/P ) changes only the
instances of θ. In particular, η̂(x, I) is η(x, ∃α (y ∈ Iα)/P ).
Lemma 3.3. Let η(x, P ) be a positive arithmetic formula. Then OID1 proves that
η̂(x, I) implies ∃α η(x, I≺α).
Proof. Use induction on positive arithmetic formulas, expressed in negation-normal
form. To handle the base case where η(x, I) is x ∈ I, suppose we have x ∈ Iβ . By
a trivial instance of ω-bounding, there are an α and an i such that x is in Iα[i]. But
this means that x is in I≺α, as required.
All the other cases are easy, except when the outermost connective is a universal
quantifier. In that case, suppose OID1 proves that ̂ϕ(x, y, I) implies ∃β ϕ(x, y, I≺β).
Using ω bounding, ̂∀y ϕ(x, y, I) then implies ∃α ∀y ∃i ϕ(x, y, I≺α[i]). By Lemma 3.2
and positivity, OID1 proves ∃α ∀y ϕ(x, y, I≺α), as required. 
Proof of Theorem 3.1. The defining axioms for the primitive recursive functions
and induction axioms of ID1 are again axioms of OID1 under the translation, so
we only have to deal with the defining axioms for I.
To verify the translation of the closure axiom in OID1 , suppose ψ̂(x, I). By
Lemma 3.3, we have ∃α ψ(x, I≺α), which implies ∃α (x ∈ Iα), as required.
This leaves only the leastness property of I, which can be expressed as a rule,
“from ∀x (ψ(x, θ/P ) → θ(x)), conclude ∀x ∈ I θ(x).” To verify the translation in
OID1 , suppose ∀x (ψ(x, θˆ/P )→ θˆ(x)). It suffices to show that for every α, we have
∀x ∈ Iα θˆ(x). We use transfinite induction on α. In the base case, when α = e,
this is immediate from the defining axiom for Ie. In the inductive step, suppose we
have ∀i ∀x ∈ Iα[i] θˆ(x). This is equivalent to ∀x ∈ I≺α θˆ(x). Using the positivity of
P , we have ∀x (ψ(x, I≺α) → ψ(x, θˆ/P )). Using the definition of Iα, we then have
∀x ∈ Iα θˆ(x), as required. 
4. A functional interpretation of OID1
Our next step is to interpret the theory OID1 in a second intermediate theory,
Q0TΩ + (I ). First, we describe a fragment Q0TΩ of QTΩ , which is obtained by
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restricting the language of QTΩ to allow quantification over the natural numbers
only, though we continue to allow free variables and constants of all types. We also
restrict the language so that the only atomic formulas are equalities s = t between
terms of type N . The axioms of Q0TΩ are as follows:
(1) any equality between terms of type N that can be derived in TΩ
(2) the schema of induction on N .
(3) the schema of transfinite induction, given as a rule:
θ(e) α 6= e ∧ ∀n θ(α[n])→ θ(α)
θ(t)
for any formula θ and term t of type Ω.
In the transfinite induction schema, the formula α = e is should be understood as
the formula f(α) = 0, where f is the function from Ω to N defined recursively by
f(e) = 0, f(sup g) = 1. Substitution is a derived rule in Q0TΩ , which is to say, if
the theory proves ϕ(x) where x is a variable of any type, it proves ϕ(s) for any term
s of that type. One can show this by a straightforward induction on proofs, using
the fact that any substitution instance of one of the axioms or rules of inference
above is again an axiom or rule of inference. Similarly, by induction on formulas
ϕ(x), one can show that if TΩ proves s = t for any terms s and t of the appropriate
type, then Q0TΩ proves ϕ(s)↔ ϕ(t).
The following proposition shows that in Q0TΩ we can use instances of induction
in which higher-type parameters are allowed to vary. For example, the first rule
states that in order to prove θ(α, x) for arbitrary α and x, it suffices to prove θ(e, x)
for an arbitrary x, and then, in the induction step, prove that θ(α, x) follows from
θ(α[n], a), as n ranges over the natural numbers and a ranges over a countable
sequence of parameters depending on n and x.
Proposition 4.1. The following are derived rules of Q0TΩ :
θ(e, x) α 6= e ∧ ∀i ∀j θ(α[i], f(α, x, i, j))→ θ(α, x)
θ(α, x)
and
ψ(0, x) ∀j ψ(n, f(x, n, j))→ ψ(n+ 1, x)
ψ(n, x)
For a fixed instance of ID1 , we now define the theory Q0TΩ + (I ) by adding
a new binary predicate I(α, x), which is allowed to occur in the induction axioms
and the transfinite induction rules, and the following axioms:
(4) ∀x (x 6∈ Ie).
(5) ∀α (α 6= e→ ∀x (x ∈ Iα ↔ ψ(x, I≺α))).
(6) s ∈ Iα ↔ t ∈ Iβ whenever s, α, t, and β are terms such that TΩ proves
s = t and α = β.
Proposition 4.1 extends to this new theory, as does the substitution rule. Thanks
to axiom (6), if ϕ(x) is any formula of Q0TΩ + (I ) and s and t are any terms such
that TΩ proves s = t, then Q0TΩ + (I ) proves ϕ(s)↔ ϕ(t).
The goal of this section is to use a functional interpretation to interpret OID1
in Q0TΩ + (I ). As in Burr [10], we use a variant of Shoenfield’s interpretation [29]
which incorporates an idea due to Diller and Nahm [11]. The Shoenfield interpre-
tation works for classical logic, based on the connectives ∀, ∨, and ¬. This has the
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virtue of cutting down on the number of axioms and rules that need to be verified,
and keeping complexity down. Alternatively, we could have used a Diller-Nahm
variant of the ordinary Go¨del interpretation, combined with a double-negation in-
terpretation. The relationship between the latter approach and the Shoenfield
interpretation is now well understood (see [33, 3]).
First, we need to introduce some notation. We will often think of an element
α 6= e of Ω as denoting a countable set {α[i] | i ∈ N} of elements of Ω. Within the
language of QTΩ , we therefore define α ⊑ β by
α ⊑ β ≡ ∀i ∃j (α[i] = β[j]),
expressing inclusion between the corresponding sets. Let t(i) be any term of type
Ω, where i is of type N . Then we can define the union of the sets t(0), t(1), t(2), . . .
by
⊔it(i) ≡ sup
j
t(j0)[j1],
where j0 and j1 denote the projections of j under a primitive recursive coding
of pairs. In other words, ⊔it(i) represents the set {t(i)[k] | i ∈ N, k ∈ N}. In
particular, we have that for every i, t(i) ⊑ ⊔it(i), since for every k we have t(i)[k] =
(⊔it(i))[(i, k)]. Binary unions, s ⊔ t, can be defined in a similar way.
We can extend these notions to higher types. Define the set of pure Ω-types to be
the smallest set of types containing Ω and closed under the operation taking σ and
τ to σ → τ . Note that every pure Ω-type τ has the form σ1 → σ2 → . . . σk → Ω.
We can therefore lift the notions above to a, b, and t of arbitrary pure type, by
defining them to hold pointwise, as follows:
a[i] ≡ λx ((ax)[i])
a ⊑ b ≡ ∀i ∃j ∀x ((ax)[i] = (bx)[j])
⊔it ≡ λx (⊔i(tx))
s ⊔ t ≡ λx ((sx) ⊔ (tx)),
where in each case x is a tuple of variables chosen so that the resulting term has type
Ω. Thus, if a is of any pure type, we can think of a as representing the countable
set {a[i] | i ∈ N}, in which case ⊑ and ⊔ have the expected behavior.
Below we will be interested in the situation where TΩ can prove a ⊑ b in the
sense that there is an explicit term f(i), not involving x, such that TΩ proves
(ax)[i] = (bx)[f(i)]. Notice that when TΩ proves a ⊑ b in this sense, Q0TΩ + (I )
proves ϕ(a[i]) → ϕ(b[f(i)]) for any formula ϕ, and hence ∃i ϕ(a[i]) → ∃j ϕ(b[j]).
Notice also that TΩ proves t(i) ⊑ ⊔it(i), s ⊑ s ⊔ t, and t ⊑ s ⊔ t in this sense.
To each formula ϕ in the language of OID1 , we associate a formula ϕ
S of the
form ∀a ∃b ϕS(a, b), where a and b are tuples of variables of certain pure Ω-types
(which are implicit in the definitions below), and ϕS is a formula in the language
of Q0TΩ + (I ). The interpretation is defined, inductively, in such a way that the
following monotonicity property is preserved: whenever TΩ proves b ⊑ b′ in the
sense above, Q0TΩ + (I ) proves ϕS(a, b)→ ϕS(a, b
′). In the base case, we define
I(α, t)S ≡ I(α, t)
(s = t)S ≡ s = t
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In the inductive step, suppose ϕS is ∀a ∃b ϕS(a, b) and ψS is ∀c ∃d ψS(c, d). Then
we define
(ϕ ∨ ψ)S ≡ ∀a, c ∃b, d (ϕS(a, b) ∨ ψS(c, d))
(∀x ϕ)S ≡ ∀a ∃b (∀x ϕS(a, b))
(∀α ϕ)S ≡ ∀α, a ∃b ϕS(a, b)
(¬ϕ)S ≡ ∀B ∃a (∃i ¬ϕS(a[i], B(a[i]))).
Verifying the monotonicity claim above is straightforward; the inner existential
quantifier in the clause for negation takes care of the only case that would other-
wise have given us trouble. Note in particular the clause for universal quantification
over the natural numbers. Our functional interpretation is concerned with bounds;
because we can compute “countable unions” using the operator ⊔, we can view
quantification over the natural numbers as “small” and insist that the bound pro-
vided by b is independent of x. Note also that if ϕ is a purely arithmetic formula,
ϕS is just ϕ.
The rest of this section is devoted to proving the following:
Theorem 4.2. Suppose OID1 proves ϕ, and ϕ
S is the formula ∀a ∃b ϕS(a, b).
Then there are terms b of TΩ involving at most the variables a and the free variables
of ϕ of type Ω such that Q0TΩ + (I ) proves ϕS(a, b).
Importantly, the terms b in the statement of the theorem do not depend on the
free variables of ϕ of type N .
As usual, the proof is by induction on derivations. The details are similar to
those in Burr [10]. As in Shoenfield [29], we can take the logical axioms and rules
to be the following:
(1) excluded middle: ¬ϕ ∨ ϕ
(2) substitution: ∀x ϕ(x)→ ϕ(t), and ∀α ϕ(α)→ ϕ(t)
(3) expansion: from ϕ conclude ϕ ∨ ψ
(4) contraction: from ϕ ∨ ϕ conclude ϕ
(5) cut: from ϕ ∨ ψ and ¬ϕ ∨ θ, conclude ψ ∨ θ.
(6) ∀-introduction: from ϕ∨ψ conclude ∀x ϕ∨ψ, assuming x is not free in ψ;
and similarly for variables of type Ω
(7) equality axioms
The translation of excluded middle is
∀B, a′ ∃a, b′ (∃i ¬ϕS(a[i], B(a[i])) ∨ ϕS(a
′, b′)).
Given B and a′, let a = supi a
′, so that a[i] = a′ for every i; in other words, a
represents the singleton set {a′}. Let b′ = B(a′). Then the matrix of the formula
holds with i = 0.
The translation of substitution for the natural numbers is equivalent to
∀B, a′ ∃a, b′ (∀i, x ϕS(x, a[i], B(a[i]))→ ϕS(t, a
′, b′)).
(In this context, “equivalent to” means that Q0TΩ + (I ) proves that the ·S part of
the translation is equivalent to the expression in parentheses.) Once again, given
B and a′, letting a = supi a
′ and b′ = B(a′) works.
Handling substitution for Ω and expansion is straightforward. Consider the
contraction rule. By the inductive hypothesis we have terms b = b(a, c) and d =
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d(a, c) satisfying
ϕS(a, b(a, c)) ∨ ϕS(c, d(a, c)).
Define f(e) to be b(e, e)⊔d(e, e). Then TΩ proves b(e, e) ⊑ f(e) and d(e, e) ⊑ f(e).
By substitution and monotonicity we have ϕS(e, f(e)) ∨ ϕS(e, f(e)), and hence
ϕS(e, f(e)), as required.
Consider cut. By the inductive hypothesis we have terms b = b(a, c) and d =
d(a, c) satisfying
(1) ϕS(a, b(a, c)) ∨ ψS(c, d(a, c)),
and terms a′ = a′(B, e) and f = f(B, e) satisfying
(2) ∃i ¬ϕS(a
′(B, e)[i], B(a′(B, e))[i]) ∨ θS(e, f(B, e)).
We need terms d′ = d′(c′, e′) and f ′ = f ′(c′, e′) satisfying
ψS(c
′, d′(c′, e′)) ∨ θS(e
′, f ′(c′, e′)).
Given c′ and e′, and the terms b(a, c), d(a, c), a′(B, e), and f(B, e), define B′ =
λa b(a, c′), define a′′ = supi a
′(B′, e′), and then define d′ = d(a′′, c′) and f ′ =
f(B′, e′). Since TΩ proves B
′(a′′) = b(a′′, c′), from (1) we have
ϕS(a
′′, B′(a′′)) ∨ ψS(c
′, d′).
Since a′′[i] = a′(B′, e′) for every i, from (2) we have
¬ϕS(a
′′, B′(a′′)) ∨ θS(e
′, f ′).
Applying cut in Q0TΩ + (I ), we have ψS(c
′, d′) ∨ θS(e′, f ′), as required.
The treatment of ∀-introduction over N and Ω is straightforward. We can take
the equality axioms to be reflexivity, symmetry, transitivity, and congruence with
respect to the basic function and relation symbols in the language. These, as well as
the defining equations for primitive recursive function symbols in the language and
the defining axioms for I, are verified by the fact that for formulas whose quantifiers
ranging only over N , ϕS = ϕ.
Thus we only have to deal with the other axioms of OID1 , namely, ω bounding,
induction on N , and transfinite induction on Ω. Note that if ϕ has quantifiers
ranging only over N , the definition of ∃ in terms of ∀ implies that (∃α ϕ(α))S is
equivalent to ∃α ∃i ϕ(α[i]). To interpret the translation of ω-bounding, we therefore
need to define a term β = β(α) satisfying
∀x ∃i ϕS(x, α[i])→ ∃j ∀x ∃k ϕS(x, (β[j])[k]).
Setting β = supj α means that for every j we have β[j] = α, so this β works.
We can take induction on the natural numbers to be given by the rule “from
ϕ(0) and ϕ(x)→ ϕ(x+ 1) conclude ϕ(t) for any term t.” From a proof of the first
hypothesis, we obtain a term b = b(a) satisfying
(3) ϕS(0, a, b).
From a proof of the second hypothesis, we obtain terms a′ = a′(B′, a′′) and b′′ =
b′′(B′, a′′) satisfying
(4) ∀i ϕS(x, a
′[i], B′(a′[i]))→ ϕS(x+ 1, a
′′, b′′).
If suffices to define a function f(x, aˆ) and show that we can prove
(5) ϕS(x, aˆ, f(x, aˆ)),
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since if we then define bˆ(aˆ) = ⊔xf(x, aˆ), we have ϕS(x, aˆ, bˆ) by the monotonicity
property of our translation. Define f by
f(0, aˆ) = b(aˆ)
f(x+ 1, aˆ) = b′′(λa f(x, a), aˆ)
Let B′ denote λa f(x, a), so f(x+1, aˆ) = b′′(B′, aˆ). Let A(x, aˆ) denote the formula
(5). From (3), we have A(0, aˆ), and from (4) we have ∀i A(x, a′(B′, aˆ)[i])→ A(x+
1, aˆ). Using Proposition 4.1, we obtain A(x, aˆ), as required.
Transfinite induction, expressed as the rule “from ϕ(e) and ∀n ϕ(α[n]) → ϕ(α)
conclude ϕ(α),” is handled in a similar way. From a proof of the first hypothesis
we obtain a term b = b(a) satisfying
(6) ϕS(e, a, b).
From a proof of the second hypothesis we obtain terms a′ = a′(α,B′, a′′) and
b′′ = b′′(α,B′, a′′) satisfying
(7) ∀i ∀n ϕS(α[n], a
′[i], B′(a′[i]))→ ϕS(α, a
′′, b′′).
It suffices to define a function f satisfying
ϕS(α, aˆ, f(α, aˆ))
for every α and aˆ, since then bˆ = f(α, aˆ) is the desired term. Let A(α, aˆ) be this
last formula, and define f by recursion on α:
f(α, aˆ) =
{
b(a) if α = e
b′′(α, λa (⊔jf(α[j], a)), aˆ) otherwise.
Write B′ for the expression λa (⊔jf(α[j], a)), so we have f(α, aˆ) = b′′(α,B′, aˆ)
when α 6= e. We will use the transfinite induction rule given by Proposition 4.1 to
show that A(α, aˆ) holds for every α and aˆ. From (6), we have A(e, aˆ), so it suffices
to show
α 6= e ∧ ∀n, i A(α[n], a′[i])→ A(α, aˆ),
where a′ is the term a′(α,B′, aˆ). Arguing in Q0TΩ + (I ), assume α 6= e and
∀n, i A(α[n], a′[i]), that is,
∀n, i ϕS(α[n], a
′[i], f(α[n], a′[i])).
By monotonicity, we have
∀n, i ϕS(α[n], a
′[i],⊔jf(α[j], a
′[i])).
By the definition of B′, this is just
∀n, i ϕS(α[n], a
′[i], B′(a′[i])).
By (7), this implies
ϕS(α, aˆ, f(α, aˆ)),
which is A(α, aˆ) as required. This concludes the proof of Theorem 4.2.
Our theory Q0TΩ + (I ) is inspired by Feferman [12], and, in particular, the
theory denoted TΩ + (µ) in [6, Section 9]. That theory, like Q0TΩ + (I ), combines
a classical treatment of quantification over the natural numbers with a constructive
treatment of the finite types over Ω.
The principal novelty of our interpretation, however, is the use of the Diller-
Nahm method in the clause for negation, and the resulting monotonicity property.
This played a crucial rule in the interpretation of transfinite induction. The usual
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Dialectica interpretation would require us to choose a single candidate for the failure
of an inductive hypothesis, something that cannot be done constructively. Instead,
using the Diller-Nahm trick, we recursively “collect up” a countable sequence of
possible counterexamples. (The original Diller-Nahm trick involved using only finite
sequences of counterexamples; we are grateful to Paulo Oliva for pointing out to
us that the extension of the method to more general sequences of counterexamples
seems to have been first used by Stein [32].)
Similar uses of monotonicity can be found in functional interpretations developed
by Kohlenbach [23, 24] and Ferreira and Oliva [13], as well as in the forcing inter-
pretations described in Avigad [5]. The functional interpretations of Avigad [4],
Burr [10], and Ferreira and Oliva [13] also make use of the Diller-Nahm trick. But
Kohlenbach, Ferreira, and Oliva rely on majorizability relations, which cannot be
represented in Q0TΩ , due to the restricted uses of quantification in that theory.
Our interpretation is perhaps closest to the one found in Burr [10], but a key differ-
ence is in our interpretation of universal quantification over the natural numbers;
as noted above, because we are computing bounds and our functionals are closed
under countable sequences, the universal quantifier is absorbed by the witnessing
functional.
5. Interpreting Q0TΩ + (I ) in QT
i
Ω
The hard part of the interpretation is now behind us. It is by now well known that
one can embed infinitary proof systems for classical logic in the various constructive
theories listed in Theorem 2.4. This idea was used by Tait [34], to provide a
constructive consistency proof for the subsystem Σ11 -CA of second-order arithmetic.
It was later used by Sieg [30, 31] to provide a direct reduction of the classical theory
ID1 to the constructive theory ID
i,sp
2 , as well as the corresponding reductions for
theories of transfinitely iterated inductive definitions (see Section 6). Here we show
that, in particular, one can define an infinitary proof system in QT iΩ , and use it
to interpret Q0TΩ + (I ) in a way that preserves Π2 formulas. The methods are
essentially those of Sieg [30, 31], adapted to the theories at hand. In fact, our
interpretation yields particular witnessing functions in TΩ , yielding Theorem 2.5.
Let us define the set of infinitary constant propositional formulas, inductively,
as follows:
• ⊤ and ⊥ are formulas.
• If ϕ0, ϕ1, ϕ2, . . . are formulas, so are
∨
i∈N ϕi and
∧
i∈N ϕi.
Take a sequent Γ to be a finite set of such formulas. As usual, we write Γ,∆ for
Γ ∪∆ and Γ, ϕ for Γ ∪ {ϕ}. We define a cut-free infinitary proof system for such
formulas with the following rules:
• Γ,⊤ is an axiom for each sequent Γ.
• From Γ, ϕi for some i conclude Γ,
∨
i∈N ϕi.
• From Γ, ϕi for every i conclude Γ,
∧
i∈N ϕi.
We also define a mapping ϕ 7→ ¬ϕ recursively, as follows:
• ¬⊤ = ⊥
• ¬⊥ = ⊤
• ¬
∨
i∈N ϕi =
∧
i∈N ¬ϕi.
• ¬
∧
i∈N ϕi =
∨
i∈N ¬ϕi.
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Note that the proof system does not include the cut rule, namely, “from Γ, ϕ and
Γ,¬ϕ include Γ.” In this section we will show that it is possible to represent
propositional formulas and infinitary proofs in the language of QT iΩ in such a way
that QT iΩ proves that the set of provable sequents is closed under cut. We will then
show that this infinitary proof system makes it possible to interpret Q0TΩ + (I )
in a way that preserves Π2 sentences. This will yield Theorem 2.5. In fact, our
interpretation will yield explicit functions witnessing the truth of the Π2 from the
proof in Q0TΩ + (I ).
We can represent formulas in QT iΩ as well-founded trees whose end nodes are
labeled either ⊤ or ⊥ and whose internal nodes are labeled either
∨
or
∧
. A well-
founded tree is simply an element of Ω. As in the Appendix, if α is an element
of Ω, then one can assign to each node of α a unique “address,” σ, where σ is a
finite sequence of natural numbers. Since these can be coded as natural numbers, a
labeling of α from the set {⊤,⊥,
∨
,
∧
} is a function l from N to N . The assertion
that α, l is a formula, i.e. that the labeling has the requisite properties, is given by
a universal formula in QT iΩ . Using λ-abstraction we can define functions F with
recursion of the following form:
F (α, l) =
{
G(l(∅)) if α = e
H(λn F (α[n], λσ l((n)ˆ σ))) otherwise,
where ∅ denotes the sequence of length 0. This yields a principle of recursive
definition on formulas, which can be used, for example, to define the map ϕ→ ¬ϕ.
(This particular function can be defined more simply by just switching ⊤ with ⊥
and
∧
with
∨
in the labeling.) A principle of induction on formulas is obtained
in a similar way. We can now represent proofs as well-founded trees labeled by
finite sets of formulas and rules of inference, yielding principles of induction and
recursion on proofs as well.
We will write ⊢ Γ for the assertion that Γ has an infinitary proof, and we will
write ⊢ ϕ instead of ⊢ {ϕ}. The proofs of the following in QT iΩ are now standard
and straightforward (see, for example, [28, 31]).
Lemma 5.1 (Weakening). If ⊢ Γ and Γ′ ⊇ Γ then ⊢ Γ′.
Lemma 5.2 (Excluded middle). For every formula ϕ, ⊢ {ϕ,¬ϕ}.
Lemma 5.3 (Inversion).
• If ⊢ Γ,⊥, then ⊢ Γ.
• If ⊢ Γ,
∧
i∈N ϕi, then ⊢ Γ, ϕi for every i.
The first and third of these is proved using induction on proofs in QT iΩ . The
second is proved using induction on formulas.
Lemma 5.4 (Admissibility of cut). If ⊢ Γ, ϕ and ⊢ Γ,¬ϕ, then ⊢ Γ.
Proof. We show how to cast the usual proof as a proof by induction on formulas,
with a secondary induction on proofs. For any formula ϕ, define
ϕ∨ =
{
ϕ if ϕ is ⊤ or of the form
∨
i∈N ψi
¬ϕ otherwise.
We express the claim to be proved as follows:
For every formula ϕ, for every proof d, the following holds: if d is a
proof of a sequent of the form Γ, ϕ∨, then ⊢ Γ,¬(ϕ∨) implies ⊢ Γ.
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The most interesting case occurs when ϕ = ϕ∨ is of the form
∨
i∈N ψi, and the last
inference of d is of the form
Γ,
∨
i∈N ψi, ψj
Γ,
∨
i∈N ψi
Given a proof of Γ,
∧
i∈N ¬ψi, apply weakening and the inner inductive hypothesis
for the immediate subproof of d to obtain a proof of Γ, ψj , apply inversion to obtain
a proof of Γ,¬ψj , and then apply the outer inductive hypothesis to the subformula
¬ψj of ϕ. 
We now assign, to each formula ϕ(x¯) in the language of Q0T
i
Ω + (I ), an infini-
tary formula ϕˆ(x¯). More precisely, to each formula ϕ(x¯) we assign a function Fϕ(x¯)
of TΩ , in such a way that QT
i
Ω proves “for every x¯, Fϕ(x¯) is an infinitary proposi-
tional formula.” We may as well take ∨, ¬, and ∀ to be the logical connectives of
Q0T
i
Ω + (I ), and use the Shoenfield axiomatization of predicate logic given in the
last section. For formulas not involving Iα, the assignment is defined inductively
as follows:
• ŝ = t is equal to ⊤ if s = t, and ⊥ otherwise.
• ϕ̂ ∨ ψ is equal to
∨
j θ̂j , where θ0 = ϕ and θj = ψ for j > 0.
• ̂∀x ϕ(x) is
∧
j ϕ̂(j).
• ¬̂ϕ is ¬ϕ̂.
If I corresponds to the inductive definition ψ(x, P ), the interpretation of x ∈ Iα is
defined recursively:
x ∈ Iα =
{
⊥ if α = e
̂ψ(x, I≺α) otherwise.
The following lemma asserts that this interpretation is sound.
Lemma 5.5. If Q0TΩ + (I ) proves ϕ(x¯), then QT
i
Ω proves that for every x¯, ⊢
ϕˆ(x¯).
Proof. We simply run through the axioms and rules of inference in Q0TΩ + (I ).
If s = t is a theorem of TΩ , it is also a theorem of QT
i
Ω . Hence QT
i
Ω proves
ŝ = t = ⊤, and so ⊢ ŝ = t.
The interpretation of the logical axioms and rules are easily validated in the
infinitary propositional calculus augmented with the cut rule, and the interpretation
of the defining axioms for Iα are trivially verified given the translation of t̂ ∈ Iα.
This leaves only induction on N and transfinite induction on Ω. We will consider
transfinite induction on Ω; the treatment of induction on N is similar.
We take transfinite induction to be given by the rule “from ϕ(e) and α 6= e ∧
∀n ϕ(α[n]) → ϕ(α) conclude ϕ(α).” Arguing in Q0TΩ + (I ), suppose for every
instantiation of α and the parameters of ϕ there is an infinitary derivation of the
·̂ translation of these hypothesis. Use transfinite induction to show that for every
α there is an infinitary proof of ϕ̂(α). When α = e, this is immediate. In the
inductive step we have infinitary proofs of ϕ̂(α[n]) for every n. Applying the
∧
-
rule, we obtain an infinitary proof of ̂∀n ϕ(α[n]), and hence, using ordinary logical
operations in the calculus with cut, a proof of ϕ̂(α). 
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We note that with a little more care, one can obtain cut-free proofs of the
induction and transfinite induction axioms; see, for example, [7].
Lemma 5.6. Let ϕ be a formula of the form ∀x¯ ∃y¯ R(x¯, y¯), where R is primitive
recursive. Then QT iΩ proves that ⊢ ϕˆ implies ϕ.
Proof. Using a primitive recursive coding of tuples we can assume, without loss of
generality, that each of x¯ and y¯ is a single variable. Using the inversion lemma, it
suffices to prove the statement for Σ1 formulas, which we can take to be of the form
∃y S(y) for some primitive recursive S. Use induction on proofs to prove the slightly
more general claim that given any proof of either {̂∃y S(y)} or {̂∃y S(y),⊥} there
is a j satisfying S(j). In a proof of either sequent, the last rule rule can only have
been a
∨
rule, applied to a sequent of the form {Ŝ(j)} or {̂∃y S(y), Ŝ(j)}. If Ŝ(j)
equals ⊤, j is the desired witness; otherwise, apply the inductive hypothesis. 
Putting the pieces together, we have shown:
Theorem 5.7. Every Π2 theorem of Q0TΩ + (I ) is a theorem of QT
i
Ω .
Together with Theorems 3.1 and 4.2, this yields Theorem 2.5. Note that every
time we used induction on formulas or proofs in the lemmas above, the arguments
give explicit constructions that are represented by terms of TΩ . So we actually
obtain, from an ID1 proof of a Π2 sentence, a TΩ term witnessing the conclusion
and a proof that this is the case in QT iΩ . By Theorem 2.4, this can be converting
to a proof in TΩ , if desired.
Our reduction of ID1 to a constructive theory has been carried out in three steps,
amounting, essentially, to a functional interpretation on top of a straightforward
cut elimination argument. A similar setup is implicit in the interpretation of ID1
due to Buchholz [7], where a forcing interpretation is used in conjunction with an
infinitary calculus akin to the one we have used here. We have also considered
alternative reductions of Q0TΩ + (I ) that involve either a transfinite version of the
Friedman A-translation [14] or a transfinite version of the Dialectica interpretation.
These yield interpretations of Q0TΩ + (I ) not in QT
i
Ω , however, but in a Martin-
Lo¨f type theory ML1V with a universe and a type of well-founded sets [1]. ML1V
is known to have the same strength as ID1 , but although many consider ML1V
to be a legitimate constructive theory in its own right, we do not know of any
reduction of ML1V to one of the other constructive theories listed in Theorem 2.4
that does not subsume a reduction of ID1 . Thus the methods described in this
section seem to provide an easier route to a stronger result.
6. Iterating the interpretation
In this section, we consider theories IDn of finitely iterated inductive definitions.
These are defined in the expected way: IDn+1 bears the same relationship to IDn
that ID1 bears to PA. In other words, in IDn+1 one can introduce a inductive
definitions given by formulas ψ(x, P ), where ψ is a formula in the language of IDn
together with the new predicate P , in which P occurs only positively.
Writing Ω0 for N and Ω1 for Ω, we can now define a sequence of theories TΩn .
For each n ≥ 1 take TΩn+1 to add to TΩn a type Ωn+1 of trees branching over
Ωn, with corresponding constant e and functionals sup : (Ωn → Ωn+1) → Ωn+1
and sup−1 : Ωn+1 → (Ωn → Ωn+1). Once again, we extend primitive recursion
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in TΩn to the larger system and add a principle of primitive recursion on Ωn+1.
The theories QT iΩn+1 are defined analogously. It is convenient to act as though for
each i < j, Ωj is closed under unions indexed by Ωi; this can arranged by fixing
injections of each Ωi into Ωj−1.
In this section, we show that our interpretation extends to IDn , to yield the
following generalization of Theorem 2.5:
Theorem 6.1. Every Π2 sentence provable in IDn is provable in QT
i
Ωn
.
As with Theorem 2.5, the proof yields a particular term witnessing the Π2 as-
sertion, and the correctness of that witnessing term can be established in TΩn , by
a generalization of Theorem 2.4. The interpretation can be further extended to
theories of transfinitely iterated inductive definitions, as described in [9]. We do
not, however, know of any ordinary mathematical arguments that are naturally
represented in such theories.
To extend the theories OID1 to theories OIDn , we first have to generalize the
schema of ω-bounding. For each i < j, define the schema of Ωi-Ωj-bounding as
follows:
∀αΩi ∃βΩj ϕ(α, β)→ ∃βΩj ∀αΩi ∃γΩi ϕ(α, β[γ]).
for every formula ϕ with quantifiers ranging over the types Ω0, . . . ,Ωi. With this
notation, the ω-bounding schema is now corresponds to Ω0-Ω1-bounding.
We extend the theories OID1 to theories OIDn in the expected way, where now
OIDn includes the schema of Ωi-Ωj-bounding for each i < j ≤ n. The fixed points
I1, . . . , In of IDn are interpreted iteratively according to the recipe in Section 3. In
particular, if ψj(x, P ) is gives the definition of the jth inductively defined predicate
Ij , the translation of ψj has quantifiers ranging over at most Ωj−1, and t ∈ Ij is
interpreted as ∃αΩj (t ∈ Ij,α), where the predicates Ij(α, x) are defined in analogy
to I(α, x). This yields:
Theorem 6.2. If IDn proves ϕ, then OIDn proves ϕˆ.
Next, we define theories Qn−1TΩn + (I ) in analogy to the theory Q0TΩ + (I )
of Section 4, except that we include the Ωi-Ωj-bounding axioms for i < j < n in
Qn−1TΩn + (I ). Now it is quantification over the types Ω0, . . . ,Ωn−1 that is consid-
ered “small,” and absorbed into the target theory. In particular, for i < j < n, the
Ωi-Ωj-bounding axioms of OIDn are unchanged by the functional interpretation.
The Ωi-Ωn bounding axioms for i < n, induction on N , and transfinite induction
on Ωn are interpreted as in Section 4. With the corresponding modifications to ϕ
S ,
we then have the analogue to Theorem 4.2:
Theorem 6.3. Suppose OIDn proves ϕ, and ϕ
S is the formula ∀a ∃b ϕS(a, b).
Then there are terms b of TΩn involving at most the variables a and the free variables
of ϕ of type Ωn such that Qn−1TΩn + (I ) proves ϕS(a, b).
In the last step, we have to embed Qn−1TΩn + (I ) into an infinitary proof system
in QT iΩn . The method of doing this is once again found in [30, 31], and an extension
of the argument described in Section 5. We extend the definition of the infinitary
propositional formulas so that when, for each α ∈ Ωj with j < n, ϕα is a formula,
so are
∨
α∈Ωj
ϕα and
∧
α∈Ωj
ϕα. The proof of cut elimination, and the verification
of transfinite induction and the defining axioms for the predicates Ij(α, x), are
essentially unchanged. The only additional work that is required is to handle the
18 JEREMY AVIGAD AND HENRY TOWSNER
bounding axioms; this is taken care of using a style of bounding argument that is
fundamental to the ordinal analysis of such infinitary systems (see [26, 27, 30, 31]).
Lemma 6.4. For every i < j < n, QT iΩn proves the translation of the Ωi-Ωj
bounding axioms.
Proof (sketch). Since QT iΩn establishes the provability of the law of the excluded
middle in the infinitary language, it suffices to show that for every sequent Γ with
quantifiers ranging over at most Ωi, if ⊢ Γ, ∀αΩi ∃βΩj ϕ(α, β), then there is a
β in Ωj such that for every α in Ωi, ⊢ ∃γΩi ϕ(α, β[γ]). But this is essentially a
consequence of the “Boundedness lemma for Σ” in Sieg [31, page 16 2]; the requisite
β is defined by an explicit recursion on the derivation. 
This gives us the proper analogue of Theorem 5.7, and hence Theorem 6.1.
Theorem 6.5. Every Π2 theorem of Qn−1TΩn + (I ) is a theorem of QT
i
Ωn
.
Appendix: Kreisel’s trick and induction with parameters
For completeness, we sketch a proof of Proposition 2.3. Full details can be found
in [17, 18].
Proposition 2.3. The following is a derived rule of TΩ :
ϕ(e, x) α 6= e ∧ ϕ(α[g(α, x)], h(α, x)) → ϕ(α, x)
ϕ(s, t)
for quantifier-free formulas ϕ.
Proof. We associate to each node of an element of Ω a finite sequence σ of natural
numbers, where the ith child of the node corresponding to σ is assigned σ (ˆi). Then
the subtree ασ of α rooted at σ (or e if σ is not a node of α) can be defined by
recursion on Ω as follows:
eσ = e
(sup f)σ =
{
sup f if σ = ∅
(f(i))τ if σ = (i)ˆ τ
Here ∅ denotes the sequence of length 0.
Now, given ϕ, g, and h as in the statement of the lemma, we define a function
k(α, x, n) by primitive recursion on n. The function k uses the the second clause
of the rule to compute a sequence of pairs (σ, y) with the property that ϕ(ασ , y)
implies ϕ(α, x). For readability, we fix α and x and write k(n) instead of k(α, x, n).
We also write k0(n) for (k(n))0 and k1(n) for (k(n))1.
k(0) = (∅, x)
k(n+ 1) =
 (k0(n)ˆ (g(αk0(n), k1(n))),h(αk0(n), k1(n))) if αk0(n) 6= e
k(n) otherwise.
Ordinary induction on the natural numbers shows that for every n, ϕ(αk0(n), k1(n))
implies ϕ(α, x). So, it suffices to show that for some n, αk0(n) = e.
Since k0(0) ⊆ k0(1) ⊆ k0(2) ⊆ . . . is an increasing sequence of sequences, it
suffices to establish the more general claim that for every α and every function f
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from N to N , there is an n such that α(f(0),...,f(n−1)) = e. To that end, by recursion
on Ω, define
g(α, f) =
{
1 + g(α[f(0)], λn f(n+ 1)) if α 6= e
0 otherwise
Let h(m) = g(α(f(0),...,f(m−1)), λn f(n +m)). By induction on m we have h(0) =
m+ h(m) as long as α(f(0),...,f(m−1)) 6= e. In particular, setting m = h(0), we have
h(h(0)) = 0, which implies α(f(0),...,f(h(0)−1)) = e, as required. 
The following principles of induction and recursion were used in Section 4.
Proposition 4.1. The following are derived rules of Q0TΩ :
θ(e, x) α 6= e ∧ ∀i ∀j θ(α[i], f(α, x, i, j))→ θ(α, x)
θ(α, x)
and
ψ(0, x) ∀j ψ(n, f(x, n, j))→ ψ(n+ 1, x)
ψ(n, x)
Proof. Consider the first rule. For any element α of Ω and finite sequence of natural
numbers σ (coded as a natural number), once again we let ασ denote the subtree
of α rooted at σ. Let τ be the type of x. We will define a function h(α, g, σ) by
recursion on α, which returns a function of type N → τ , with the property that
h(α, g, ∅) = g, and for every σ, θ(ασ, x) holds for every x in the range of h(α, g, σ).
Applying the conclusion to h(α, λi x, ∅) will yield the desired result.
The function h is defined as follows:
h(α, g, σ) =
{
g if α = e or σ = ∅
h(α[i], λl f(α, g(l0), i, l1), σ
′) if α 6= e and σ = σ′ (ˆi)
Using transfinite induction on α, we have
∀σ ∀v θ(ασ, h(α, g, σ)(v))
for every α, and hence and hence θ(α, h(α, λi x, ∅)(0)). Since h(α, λi x, ∅)(0) =
(λi x)(0) = x, we have the desired conclusion.
The second rule is handled in a similar way. 
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